Urgent Field Safety Notice

MiniMed[™] remote controller (MMT-500 or MMT-503)

Important Device Information

August 2018

Medtronic reference: FA830

Dear Distribution Partner, Service Provider,

Our records show that one or more of your patients may be using an optional MiniMedTM remote controller model number **MMT-500** or **MMT-503**.

We are informing you of a potential security risk related to the Medtronic MiniMed[™] 508 and Medtronic MiniMed[™] Paradigm[™] series insulin pumps when using the corresponding MiniMed[™] remote controller.

Explanation of the issue

The Medtronic remote controller, which uses a wireless (RF) radio frequency to communicate with the insulin pump, helps in programming a set amount of insulin (or bolus) into the Medtronic pump discreetly while keeping the device concealed.

An external security researcher has identified a potential vulnerability related to the MiniMed[™] Paradigm[™] family of insulin pumps and corresponding remote controller. The researcher's report states that an unauthorized individual in close proximity of an insulin pump user could potentially copy the wireless radio frequency (RF) signals from the user's remote controller (while they are in the process of delivering a remote bolus) and play those back later to deliver an involuntary bolus of insulin to the pump user. This could lead to potential health risks such as hypoglycemia if additional insulin is delivered beyond the user's insulin requirements.

The following list shows the Medtronic remote controller and compatible Medtronic insulin pump(s) that are vulnerable to this issue.

| Remote controller | Model Number Location | Compatible Insulin pump(s) |
|---|--|---|
| Stopp bol act MiniMed MiniMed TM remote controller MMT-500 | The model # is behind the remote under the barcode | Medtronic MiniMed™ 508 pump |
| Image: Control ler MiniMed™ remote control ler MMT-503 | The model # is behind the remote under the barcode | MiniMed [™] Paradigm [™] 511 pump MiniMed [™] Paradigm [™] 512/712 pumps MiniMed [™] Paradigm [™] 515/715 pumps MiniMed [™] Paradigm [™] 522/722 pumps MiniMed [™] Paradigm [™] 523/723 pumps MiniMed [™] Paradigm [™] 523(K)/723(K) pumps MiniMed [™] 530G 551/751 pumps MiniMed [™] Paradigm [™] Veo [™] 554/754 |

Several factors must occur for the pump to be vulnerable:

- 1. The remote option for the pump would need to be enabled. This is not a factory-delivered default, and a user must choose this option.
- 2. The user's remote controller ID needs to be registered to the pump.
- 3. The Easy Bolus[™] option would need to be turned on and a bolus step size programmed in the pump.
- 4. An unauthorized individual would need to be in close proximity of the user, with necessary equipment to copy the RF signals activated, when the user is delivering a bolus using the remote controller.
- 5. The unauthorized individual would need to be in close proximity of the user to play back the RF signals to deliver a malicious remote bolus.
- 6. The user would need to ignore the pump alerts, which indicates that a remote bolus is being delivered.

Protecting the security of the insulin pump

If you or your patients are concerned about this matter, the following precautions can be taken to minimize risk to your patients:

- Turn off Easy Bolus[™] feature when not intending to use the remote bolus option
- Be attentive to the pump alerts, especially when the easy bolus option is turned on, and immediately
 - cancel any unintended bolus
- Do not connect to any third-party devices not authorized by Medtronic

Because Medtronic does not have your patients' records on file, we ask you to inform users of the MiniMed[™] remote controller (MMT-500 or MMT-503), using the enclosed letter.

Please note that if your patient has never programmed a remote controller ID into their pump and never programmed the Easy Bolus™ option, they are not susceptible to this vulnerability.

The MiniMed[™] Paradigm[™] family of insulin pumps remain safe and effective for diabetes management, so we encourage users to continue their therapy as they normally would and take these precautionary steps if concerned.

The Competent Authority of your country has been notified of this action.

At Medtronic, patient safety is our top priority, and we are committed to delivering safe and effective therapies that undergo rigorous clinical, quality, manufacturing and regulatory controls to ensure this for our customers. We appreciate your time and attention in reading this important notification.

As always, we are here to support you. If you have further questions or need assistance, please call our support line at <<mark>XXXX</mark>>.

Sincerely,

Country/BU manager

Enclosures:

- Pump User Letter
- Frequently Asked Questions

Frequently asked questions related to the issue

Q1. Is this a recall?

No, this is solely an advisory and your patients are neither required to return their insulin pump nor their remote controller.

Q2. Does insulin pump or remote controller require replacement?

No replacement is needed for the insulin pump or remote controller. The MiniMed[™] Paradigm[™] family of insulin pumps remain safe and effective for diabetes management, so we encourage patients to continue their therapy as they normally would and take the previously mentioned precautionary steps if concerned.

Q3. When did Medtronic first learn of this issue?

Medtronic was first made aware of this potential issue in late May 2018 at which time we began actively reviewing all data and reports to ensure quick and complete communications to all potentially affected patients and health care providers.

Q4. How worried should pump users be?

We understand pump users could have concerns; however, several factors must occur for any pump or remote controller to be potentially vulnerable. There have been no reports of users being affected by this issue. If pump users feel concerned about this issue, we recommend turning off the remote controller feature in the insulin pump.

Q5. Does this impact the MiniMed[™] 600 series insulin pumps?

No. This vulnerability does not impact the MiniMed[™] 600 series insulin pumps, this includes the MiniMed[™] 620G, MiniMed[™] 630G, MiniMed[™] 640G and MiniMed[™] 670G systems.

Q6. Can the remote controller be replaced with a newer model that is not vulnerable to this risk?

No, Medtronic does not have any other remote controller compatible with MiniMed[™] 508 or MiniMed[™] Paradigm[™] series insulin pumps.

Q7. Has a Medtronic device ever been manipulated?

Medtronic has not received any reports of a product being breached in this manner. If you or your patients are concerned about this issue, we recommend instructing your patient to disable the remote controller feature in their pump.

Q8. What actions is Medtronic taking to address this issue?

We have notified the appropriate regulatory authorities, published an advisory about this potential security issue, and informed healthcare professionals and patients about precautionary steps that can be taken to protect the security of their pump.

Q9. How would a patient know if someone had manipulated their insulin pump?

Several factors must occur for any pump to be potentially vulnerable. We recommend that patients are always attentive to pump alerts, especially when the Easy Bolus[™] option is turned on, and immediately cancel any unintended bolus.

Q10. What would someone need to know to exploit these vulnerabilities?

Several factors must occur for any pump to be potentially vulnerable. To ensure the security of our devices, we recommend you inform your patients to protect their pump and remote controller devices IDs.

Q11. My patients do not have or use the remote controller. Are they still vulnerable to this issue?

Please consider that if your patient has never programmed a remote controller ID into their pump and never programmed the Easy Bolus[™] option, they are not susceptible to this vulnerability. Additionally, if your patient disables the remote option or turn off the Easy Bolus[™] option on the pump, they will not be susceptible. By default, the Easy Bolus[™] and remote options are turned off in new pumps, so your patient would need to turn them on to be vulnerable.